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Twitter botnets used for political propaganda might have hit on an ingenious new way to cause mischief – bombard accounts they dislike with fake followers and retweets in an attempt to get them suspended by the site’s anti-abuse systems.

Normally, such botnets – made up of thousands of automated “sock puppet” accounts controlled from a single point – are used to spam fake news stories or bombard target Twitter accounts with large numbers of hostile tweets.

In recent weeks, however, journalists and non-profit organisations have been affected by a new twist on an old tactic which one of those affected, cybersecurity writer Brian Krebs, describes as a “tweet and follower storm”.

The trigger provoking botnet attention in this case has been writing about Russian and US politics, as news site ProPublica discovered when it gave coverage to an analysis by Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) on alleged attempts by Russian propaganda to stir up political tensions in the US.

The response of pro-Russian bots was to retweet a Twitter condemnation of the story up to 23,000 times, ostensibly an attempt to blot out its post with the Twitter equivalent of white noise.

At the same time, DFRLab staff reported receiving intimidating tweets which, again, were amplified hugely by botnets, including on August 28 the bogus claim that one of its staff, Ben Nimmo, had died.

A journalist who covered this story, Joseph Cox of The Daily Beast, reported this week that it was retweeted 1,300 times by bots while he attracted 300 new, mostly Russian-language followers within a short period of time.

Then Cox’s account was suspended by Twitter with the following message:

Caution: This account is temporarily restricted. You’re seeing this warning because there has been some unusual activity from this account.

Presumably, Twitter had detected the suspicious retweets but incorrectly associated his account with them.

Two days later and journalist Brian Krebs avoided the same fate after he commented on the bot phenomenon and was overnight rewarded with 12,000 new followers and as many retweets. Commenting on the reasons behind Cox’s suspension, he said this:

Let that sink in for a moment: A huge collection of botted accounts — the vast majority of which should be easily detectable as such — may be able to abuse Twitter’s anti-abuse tools to temporarily shutter the accounts of real people suspected of being bots!

Twitter reinstated Cox’s account after a few hours, but one conclusion is, whether by design or accident, bots have hit on a new way to annoy Twitter users they take against.

According to Krebs, the 12,000 bot account unfollowed him but remain active on the service despite their suspicious behaviour.

On one level, this is not surprising – bots (in other words, automated accounts) are allowed under Twitter’s terms and conditions and have numerous legitimate uses. What isn’t allowed are fake accounts, which Twitter has been battling for years.

When fake accounts are corralled into bots, trouble follows, with some of the biggest networks reaching hundreds of thousands of accounts. Some of them even have names, for example the 90,000-strong “Siren” bot used to lure people to porn websites.

The larger question is why, after years or claimed improvements in its security protocols, Twitter still seems unable to spot accounts that look dubious and which breach its terms and conditions.

All the big social media platforms have a problem with fake accounts used for nefarious purposes but only on Twitter do malicious bots seem able to pull off what amounts to a denial-of-service attack on individual users.

Is there a defence? After being targeted, DFRLab could find only one that was capable of deterring the bot horde – copy @Twittersupport and @Twitter on any complaint.



from Naked Security http://ift.tt/2wsIR7X

Kaspersky Labs released a highly sophisticated set of hacking tools from Russia called WhiteBear.

From February to September 2016, WhiteBear activity was narrowly focused on embassies and consular operations around the world. All of these early WhiteBear targets were related to embassies and diplomatic/foreign affair organizations. Continued WhiteBear activity later shifted to include defense-related organizations into June 2017. When compared to WhiteAtlas infections, WhiteBear deployments are relatively rare and represent a departure from the broader Skipper Turla target set. Additionally, a comparison of the WhiteAtlas framework to WhiteBear components indicates that the malware is the product of separate development efforts. WhiteBear infections appear to be preceded by a condensed spearphishing dropper, lack Firefox extension installer payloads, and contain several new components signed with a new code signing digital certificate, unlike WhiteAtlas incidents and modules.

The exact delivery vector for WhiteBear components is unknown to us, although we have very strong suspicion the group spearphished targets with malicious pdf files. The decoy pdf document above was likely stolen from a target or partner. And, although WhiteBear components have been consistently identified on a subset of systems previously targeted with the WhiteAtlas framework, and maintain components within the same filepaths and can maintain identical filenames, we were unable to firmly tie delivery to any specific WhiteAtlas component. WhiteBear focused on various embassies and diplomatic entities around the world in early 2016 -- tellingly, attempts were made to drop and display decoy pdf's with full diplomatic headers and content alongside executable droppers on target systems.

One of the clever things the tool does is use hijacked satellite connections for command and control, helping it evade detection by broad surveillance capabilities like what what NSA uses. We've wseen Russian attack tools that do this before. More details are in the Kaspersky blog post.

Given all the trouble Kaspersky is having because of its association with Russia, it's interesting to speculate on this disclosure. Either they are independent, and have burned a valuable Russian hacking toolset. Or the Russians decided that the toolset was already burned -- maybe the NSA knows all about it and has neutered it somehow -- and allowed Kaspersky to publish. Or maybe it's something in between. That's the problem with this kind of speculation: without any facts, your theories just amplify whatever opinion you had previously.

Oddly, there hasn't been much press about this. I have only found one story.


from Schneier on Security http://ift.tt/2wozac9

Instagram’s API sprung a leak, with attackers snatching email addresses and phone numbers of “high-profile” users.

We don’t know who those high-profile users are, but we do know, as Variety reports, that somebody posted nude photos of Justin Bieber on to Selena Gomez’s Instagram account on Monday.

Bare Bieber photos weren’t up for long: within minutes, the account was offline, photos from (former couple) Gomez and Bieber’s 2015 vacation in Bora Bora were deleted, the account was re-secured, and back up it went.

Was it due to hackers exploiting what Instagram said was “a bug” in its API? Or just a coincidence? We can’t say. The two could be completely unrelated: after all, much, if not all, of the nude celebrities photo grabs of Celebgate versions 1, 2 and 3 were enabled by attackers phishing login credentials to iCloud and Google email accounts.

Or then again, it could be that the Instagram attacker did in fact exploit the flaw in the social media app’s API to peek at users’ profile information. As The Register notes, the API lets developers see profile information. That’s why Instagram and Facebook both changed their terms of service in March: to turn off the data spigot for developers who were mining the platforms for surveillance purposes.

At any rate, Instagram wasn’t forthcoming with details. But here’s what it did say in a statement sent to the New York Daily News:

We recently discovered that one or more individuals obtained unlawful access to a number of high-profile Instagram users’ contact information – specifically email address and phone number – by exploiting a bug in an Instagram API.

A source told the Daily News that one person found the API bug and used it to steal information.

Instagram says that it’s warned all of its verified users about the hack. It declined to say how many accounts were affected.

Censored versions of Bieber’s photos initially appeared in the Daily News, but the Full Monty versions later made their way online, Variety reports. This isn’t the first time his nude photos have been stolen. When it happened in 2015, also while he was on vacation in Bora Bora, he told Access Hollywood that it was a violation:

My first thing was like…how can they do this? Like, I feel super violated.

I’m not a Belieber, but I do beliebe he’s right: it is a violation when thieves get their grubby mitts on our intimate photos. Here are some ways to keep it from happening:

  • Don’t click on links in email and thus get your login credentials phished away. If you really think your ISP, for example, might be trying to contact you, rather than clicking on the email link, get in touch by typing in the URL for its website and contacting the company via a phone number or email you find there.
  • Use strong passwords.
  • Lock down privacy settings on social media (here’s how to do it on Facebook, for example).
  • Don’t add people on social media you haven’t met in real life, and don’t share photos with people you don’t know and trust. For that matter, be careful of those who you consider your “friends”. This isn’t the first time that Instagram content has been grabbed: one example of creeps posing as friends can be found on the creepshot sharing site Anon-IB, where users have posted images they say they took from Instagram feeds of “a friend”.
  • Use multifactor authentication (MFA) whenever possible. MFA means you need a one-time login code, as well as your username and password, every time you log in. That’s one more thing attackers need to figure out every time they try to phish you.



from Naked Security http://ift.tt/2gup1oW

MacEwan University in Edmonton, Alberta, is the latest confirmed victim of scammers.

university scam

“On Wednesday, August 23, MacEwan University discovered it had been the victim of a phishing attack. A series of fraudulent emails convinced university staff to change electronic banking information for one of the university’s major vendors. The fraud resulted in the transfer of [Canadian] $11.8 million to a bank account that staff believed belonged to the vendor,” the Canadian university shared.

After the fraud was discovered, the university conducted an audit of business processes through its internal audit group and with the help of outside experts.

“Preliminary assessment has determined that controls around the process of changing vendor banking information were inadequate, and that a number of opportunities to identify the fraud were missed,” they noted.

Since them, additional controls were put in place to prevent further incidents.

Once the fraud was discovered after the real vendor complained of non-payment, the accounts to which the funds were sent were traced to Canada and Hong Kong, and local law enforcement agencies were contacted.

Corporate security units of banks involved with the e-transfers were also notified, and they managed to freeze the funds. The university is working with legal counsel in Montreal, London and Hong Kong to pursue civil action to recover the money.

No further details about the phishing attack were revealed, but it’s obvious this is a variant of the business email compromise (BEC) scam: the so-called “payment instruction switch” or “the supplier swindle.”

“There is never a good time for something like this to happen,” said university spokesman David Beharry, “but as our students come back to start the new academic year, we want to assure them and the community that our IT systems were not compromised during this incident. Personal and financial information, and all transactions made with the university are secure. We also want to emphasize that we are working to ensure that this incident will not impact our academic or business operations in any way.”


from Help Net Security http://ift.tt/2vxxzSL

Locky ransomware is back, again, delivered with the help of new tricks to fool users and anti-malware defenses.

Massive spam campaign

Delivered through one of the largest spam campaigns in H2 2017 – as many as 23 million sent messages per day – the newest variant adds the .lukitus extension to the encrypted files.

Locky returns

“Once all the victim’s files have been encrypted the attackers leave decryption instructions by changing the desktop background to an image with instructions as well as a HTM file on the desktop aptly named Lukitus[dot]htm,” AppRiver researchers explained.

The malware arrives in inboxes attached to emails with vague subject lines like “please print”, “documents”, “scans”, “images”, and so on, And, unfortunately for those who get infected, there are no publicly shared methods to reverse this Locky strain.

The crooks behind this malware campaign are asking 0.5 Bitcoin to deliver the decryption key.

New tricks

Security researcher Brad Duncan has flagged another spam campaign delivering the “Lukitus” variant of Locky.

This campaign takes the form of notifications supposedly coming from Dropbox, with links to compromised sites hosting fake Dropbox pages.

“When I viewed the links in Internet Explorer 11 or Microsoft Edge, they merely showed a fake Dropbox page,” Duncan noted.

“However, when I tried these same links in Google Chrome, they displayed a fake notification stating: ‘The HoeflerText font was not found.’ These notifications also had an ‘update’ button. When I clicked it, I received a JavaScript file named Win.JSFontlib09.js. That JavaScript file is designed to download and install Locky ransomware.”

The same trick works in Firefox:

Locky returns

Booby-trapped Word documents

Finally, Malwarebytes researchers have discovered another campaign seemingly delivering the same Locky variant via booby-trapped Word documents, and using a sandbox-bypass trick previously spotted being used to get the Dridex Trojan onto target machines.

“Malware authors have used booby trapped Office documents containing macros to retrieve their payloads for some time, but ordinarily, the code executes as soon as the user clicks the ‘Enable Content’ button. For analysis purposes, many sandboxes lower the security settings of various applications and enable macros by default, which allows for the automated capture of the malicious payload,” the researchers noted.

“This particular Locky campaign no longer simply triggers by running the macro itself but waits until the fake Word document is closed by the user before it starts to invoke a set of commands. In their current form, the malicious documents are likely to exhibit a harmless behavior in many sandboxes while still infecting end users that would logically close the file when they realize there is nothing to be seen.”


from Help Net Security http://ift.tt/2wXk8vI

alarm fatigueOne of the toughest challenges for an IT security team is managing and sifting through the deluge of security alerts that are created on a daily basis. Teams can waste considerable time chasing down false positives with the resultant burden on manpower and IT resources adding costs. However, the stakes are high; failing to detect an active infection can have far more serious financial consequences.

Alarms and alerts are designed to signal problems that need attention. However, when alarms are constant, and a high percentage of these are false positives, there is a real danger that we can become de-sensitised to their importance. Given this rising tide of continuous alerts, it’s perhaps of little surprise that teams are facing alarm fatigue – a situation in which teams can be overwhelmed by information and constant notifications which means that real threats become the needle in the haystack that is ignored or missed.

With organisations managing thousands of alerts each day, it’s more important than ever that organisations can cut through the noise and have confidence in the accuracy and effectiveness of solutions to detect even the most sophisticated threats.

A tsunami of alerts

The failure of antivirus to detect the latest malware and threats, has spawned an entire industry of alerting technologies, from Intrusion Detection products and black boxes deployed in the network, highlighting vague anomalies, to sandboxes and threat intelligence solutions spewing Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) incessantly into our operations.

This unending tsunami of alerts related to infections and compromises, and incidents and breaches, has then created another industry of alert consolidation, correlation tools, coalescence technology, big data analytics, attribution biased triage – and the list goes on. With limited time and manpower to deal with these threats, it’s inevitable that this information overload will place additional burdens on teams. As a result, it´s not just alarm fatigue teams are suffering from but, budget and resource fatigue also.

However what choice do they have? If the endpoint is not instrumented precisely, there is no choice but to cobble together as many diverse technologies as possible, in the hope that something will trigger an alert accurate enough to prevent escalating harm to our internal systems. This happens in the name of best practise, continuous monitoring, vigilance and resilience and this is the reality of IoC- led alerts in security operations.

Risks across the chain

There are risks on both sides of the equation: we know we can have too many alerts, and we can’t investigate them all, but there is also a risk in uninvestigated alerts. There is risk in the amount of time it takes to diagnose whether an IoC based alert is real and present in the environment, and if it is, determining if it was successful, or blocked by another security function somewhere in the environment.

If we consider a chain of events, like the kill chain, where an attack moves from one layer to the next, exploit becomes infection, successful infection becomes compromise, unchecked compromise becomes incident, and an incident with sensitive data exfiltration becomes a breach, there is the potential for a false positive and false negative or misdiagnosis at every stage in that chain.

IoC alerts are, at the end of the day, simply just indicators and the more sources of indicators there are, the greater the potential for alert fatigue at every stage in the kill chain. Alerts based on indicators are responsible for the majority of lost time in security escalations. What we alert on, needs to change; alerts need to be based on actualities in the environment, not possibilities.

Of course, the most precise place to measure actualities in the environment is the target of the attack itself, the endpoint. This is now a real alternative to the existing IoC alert avalanche that props up our ineffective antivirus. The dynamic behaviour of the endpoint is the security actuality that should form the basis of a real alert. Modelling the dynamic behaviour of the endpoint, solves the problem of protection bias, which is the fundamental flaw in security controls by which attackers are able to infiltrate our environments.

The answer to alert fatigue, and unsatisfactory risk management, lies in the move away from indicative alerts, and the problems of volume, inaccuracy and cost that it brings. We should, instead move towards the goal of alerts based on actual target system behaviours. A security escalation process based on “something is happening”, instead of “something might be happening”.


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